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FRENCH POLITICAL ISSUES UNRESOLVED AS ALLIED ARMIES ADVANCE

THE invasion of France which, according to Allied military authorities is proceeding satisfactorily; the advance of the Allies into northern Italy; the Russian offensive in Finland, launched on June 9; and the visit of Polish Premier Mikolajczyk to Washington, where he arrived on June 5—all reveal the increasingly obvious fact that the United Nations have been less successful in solving the political than the military problems of invasion. This has proved particularly true in those areas of Europe where doubts exist as to the character and composition of the governments that may assume power following liberation from Nazi rule.

U.S. POLICY ON FRANCE. President Roosevelt's announcement on June 11 that he had invited General de Gaulle, now in London, to visit Washington in the near future does not foreshadow any radical change in this country's policy toward France. This policy has been most recently expressed by Secretary of State Hull in his radio address of April 9, when he said that he and President Roosevelt were "disposed to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief," General Eisenhower. Mr. Hull's statement was implemented by General Eisenhower who, in his proclamation of June 9 to the citizens of France, declared that "it will be for the French people to provide their own civil administration and to safeguard my troops by the effective maintenance of law and order." He added that "members of the French Military Mission attached to me"—presumably representing the French Committee of National Liberation—"will furnish assistance to this end." Once victory has been achieved, he said, "the French people will be free to choose at the earliest possible moment, under democratic methods and conditions, the government under which they wish to live." To dispel the latent fear that the Allies might use some

"collaborationists," General Eisenhower said that "those who have made common cause with the enemy and so betrayed their country will be removed."

In spite of these declarations, many Americans continue to be puzzled by the reluctance of the Washington Administration to recognize the French Committee in Algiers, if not as the *de jure* government of France, at least as a provisional régime subject to review by the French people through freely-held elections. One explanation is that President Roosevelt has found it difficult to obtain the cooperation of General de Gaulle, who is not an easy person to deal with. Far more significant is Mr. Roosevelt's profound conviction, based on information he considers to be authentic, that there are many people in France who, while stubbornly hostile to the Nazis and to the Vichy régime, are not ready, for a variety of reasons, to accept General de Gaulle. Acting on this conviction, the President is said to feel that our future relations with France will be far more endangered by recognition of de Gaulle, and his arrival on French territory under our auspices, than by his non-recognition. This, clearly, is a matter of judgment and opinion. Only when France's principal cities have been liberated, and the French people are free to make their views known without fear or favor, will it be possible to say whether the President has been correct in estimating what is admittedly a highly complex situation. Meanwhile, the United States has probably gone as far as is now practicable in giving the French Committee of National Liberation top priority, so to speak, to re-establish civilian administration in the wake of Allied invasion—subject to the emergence of other patriotic groups which may not see eye to eye with de Gaulle.

DISSATISFACTION IN ALGIERS. This only partial—and all too often grudging—acknowledgment of the role General de Gaulle has played since

the dark days of June 1940 as spokesman for the Free French is understandably displeasing to the General and many of his supporters. The already tense situation has not been made any more easy by the sensitiveness of the French who, after suffering so grievously from military defeat, are now eager to demonstrate their independence and recover their national prestige. Americans have not always been sufficiently aware of this sensitiveness, nor have they always displayed the infinite tact and patience required under the circumstances. Now that the Allies are actually on French soil, it is also natural that General de Gaulle should want to assert as much authority as possible by declaring that his Committee is the Provisional Government of France, and by protesting—as he did on June 10—against administration of liberated France by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

It is unfortunate that, owing to this deadlock, the United States and Britain were unable to work out with de Gaulle, in advance, the details of post-invasion civilian administration, as has been done in the case of Belgium, Holland and Norway. One of the many issues that may arise between the French Committee, which regards itself as trustee for the French people, and the Allied High Command, is the use of special Allied currency, which has not been sanctioned by the Committee, and which it threatens to repudiate. Another issue is the refusal so far of the United States to restrict expenditures by American troops in France. American soldiers draw much higher pay than their British and Canadian comrades and, unlike them, do not have part of their pay withheld at home. As a result, American troops in North Africa—as in other areas where they are stationed—have spent freely, thus causing a sharp rise in prices and the practical disappearance of many consumers' goods, with consequent hardship and resentment on the part of French and native inhabitants. General de Gaulle wants to prevent a similar development, on a much larger scale, in France, and it would have been a gracious gesture for the United States to have complied with his request. American military commanders, however, apparently fear that restrictions on the use of soldiers' pay might lower the morale of their forces—and have chosen what they regard as the lesser of two evils.

POLICY TOWARD FINLAND AND POLAND.

Complex and painful as are the issues at stake in our relations with France, they are at least subject in some measure to decision by the United States. Far more delicate is the present state of our relations with Finland and Poland, both of which are now in the path of actual or potential Russian offensives, and are regarded by the U.S.S.R. as within its zone of strategic security. The United States which, unlike Russia and Britain, is not at war with Finland; apparently decided to place the Finns in the category of enemy belligerents following Helsinki's decision to reject Moscow's peace terms; and on June 10 the State Department referred to the "pro-German sympathies of the Finnish government and its leaders." Some observers believe that the Russian offensive may force the resignation of Premier Linkomies, whose government declined to make peace with Russia, and the establishment of a more conciliatory régime. Caught in a cross-fire between two hostile great powers—Germany and Russia—the Finns, who have enjoyed traditional sympathy in this country, are paying the price paid by many other small nations for their inability to preserve freedom of action in a world at war. Similar difficulties face the government of Premier Mikolajczyk, that claims to have the support of the Polish underground, but has been unable to come to terms with Moscow which, meanwhile, reiterates its desire for a strong, friendly Poland in the post-war world.

Both the Finns and Poles know from bitter experience that they can expect short shrift from the Nazis. But their centuries-old controversies with Russia do not promise them a happier post-war alternative, unless Russia, in collaboration with Britain and the United States, can give them some assurance that they will be able to enjoy relative freedom once Germany has been defeated. Such freedom they can enjoy only if the great powers themselves feel secure against the renewal of German aggression. The events of every succeeding day make it more and more clear that if the United Nations are to work out the problems of political strategy successfully, they must speed the creation of an international organization which would offer some measure of security to all nations, great and small.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

ITALIAN POLITICAL CHANGES POINT TOWARD DEMOCRATIC REVIVAL

As Allied troops sweep north of Rome in pursuit of the routed Germans, the Italian political situation is entering a new phase. The more important position now secured by the six parties comprising the Committee of National Liberation suggests that they acted wisely last April, when they swallowed their distaste for the King and Premier Badoglio in order to win a greater voice in the settlement of Italian affairs. Recent changes also indicate that the Allies

are allowing the Italian parties considerable leeway in reshaping the administration, even though the greater part of the country remains a theatre of war.

CHANGE WITHOUT CRISIS. The liberation of Rome on June 4 was followed by a series of significant events. On June 5, King Victor Emmanuel III withdrew from public life, in accordance with his promise of April 12 that he would retire when Allied troops entered Rome. Although not actually

abdicating, the King designated his son, Crown Prince Humbert, as his Lieutenant General to "exercise all royal prerogatives." On June 8, when Humbert, Badoglio and leaders of the six parties arrived in Rome from Naples, it became apparent that the continuance of Badoglio as Premier would be inacceptable to the popular groups.

Consequently, on June 9 Ivanoe Bonomi, 71-year old liberal chairman of the Committee of National Liberation in Rome, replaced Badoglio and set to work on the organization of a coalition government continuing the régime established at Salerno but on a broader basis. The new Premier, who had been active in politics in pre-fascist days and lived in retirement during Mussolini's rule, declared that the program of his cabinet would be "to bring back democracy to Italy, to do away with everything fascist and to see that the war effort continues." While expressing appreciation of Badoglio's efforts, he stated that his government would not include "anyone with the slightest tinge of fascism."

ITALIANS AID OWN LIBERATION. The brightest aspect of the Italian domestic scene is the fact that, despite more than two decades of fascist rule, some sections of the Italian people have proved able to organize effective resistance against the Nazis. In Rome—as in Naples many months ago—Allied troops were welcomed by Italian guerrillas, who had already played a valuable role in interfering with German communications while General Clark's Fifth Army was approaching the city. Moreover, in northern Italy, guerrillas are engaged in well-organized activity to drive out the Germans and are receiving arms, explosives, food, clothing and money from the Allies. The Italian people, on whom much contempt was lavished because they fought badly in a bad cause, give evidence of knowing how to fight when the cause is their own.

The Italian reaction against fascism and the Nazis helps to explain the spirit of President Roosevelt's radio address of June 5 on the fall of Rome, when

he said: "We want and expect the help of the future Italy toward lasting peace. All the other nations opposed to fascism and nazism ought to help to give Italy a chance." He indicated also that the Allies had planned carefully for economic relief in Rome and other liberated areas of Italy, hoping that such aid "will be an investment for the future." There can be no doubt that smooth handling of Italian problems of livelihood by the Allies in cooperation with the Bonomi cabinet will make it much easier to deal with new political issues.

THE ROAD AHEAD. It must be recognized that Italy is still only in the early stages of its reawakening and that the thorniest problems of political unity and economic reconstruction remain to be faced. Yet, it is worth noting that the issue of the King, which loomed so large several months ago, seems no longer to stand in the way of governmental action. The future of the House of Savoy, however, appears increasingly doubtful, especially since the sections of the country where anti-monarchist sentiment is strongest still remain to be liberated. An indication of the current trend of feeling may be seen in the fact that the new cabinet, unlike the one established in Salerno, has taken an oath of loyalty to the nation, not to the throne.

Only after the full liberation of the country—including the industrialized north with its densely populated, politically active cities—will it really be possible to judge accurately the strength and character of the forces at play. Meanwhile, it is to be expected that the Bonomi cabinet will itself undergo reorganization as more and more of Italy is freed. The important fact today is that the incorporation of Rome into the territory reclaimed from the Nazis has taken place without a political crisis, although not without significant political changes. Whatever difficulties the future may bring, this is a good sign not only for Italy, but also for the Allies who, at a time of great battles, could ill afford to face the type of political crisis that existed several months ago.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

For a survey of the post-war objectives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, READ:

POST-WAR PROGRAMS OF EUROPE'S UNDERGROUND

by Winifred N. Hadsel

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My Revolutionary Years, by Madame Wei Tao-ming. New York, Scribner's, 1943. \$2.75

Absorbing autobiography of the wife of the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, covering the period from her participation in terroristic activity against the Manchus down to recent years.

The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943, by George Fort Milton. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1944. \$3.00


By describing how Presidents have acted in critical instances the author gives a good idea of the way in which constitutional powers have been interpreted.

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Washington News Letter



DEBATE OPENS ON FORMS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

The Administration will be faced during the coming presidential campaign with the problem of convincing the American people that its program for post-war organization of the world is safe and wise. Doubts are being expressed here and in Britain that lasting peace can be founded on the system of great-power control of world affairs through an executive council such as that advocated on May 23 by Prime Minister Churchill and thought to be supported by President Roosevelt.

The American debate on the nature of collaboration is getting under way on the eve of conversations among representatives of the United States, Britain, Russia and China looking toward agreement on the great-power council method of world organization. These talks are expected to begin in July. Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office is reported to oppose Churchill's suggestion that three regional committees responsible to the great-power council be set up to assist in preserving order—a committee for Europe, a committee for the Far East, and a committee for the Americas. It is feared that, should such a committee be set up in Europe, it might develop into a balance of power arrangement. Some members of the British Foreign Office also ask how Canada, a British Dominion, would fit into an organization of the American Republics. In the Far East, China is the only country available to control the committee, and it is thought that China may not be ready for such a task.

REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL DOUBTS. To improve the prospects for adoption by this country of the Administration program, Secretary of State Hull has opened conversations with selected Democratic and Republican members of the House of Representatives headed by Speaker Sam Rayburn and Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin. These executive-legislative meetings followed talks between Mr. Hull and eight Senators who, President Roosevelt said on May 30, conducted themselves on a high level of non-partisanship during the discussion.

However, the Administration's hopes that the Senatorial talks would result in outspoken bi-partisan acceptance of the post-war program have not been realized. Alone among the Republican members of the Senatorial liaison committee, Warren Austin of Vermont has indicated approval of the Hull proposals. On June 6 he advocated immediate establishment of a world organization on the basis of an agreement among the United States, Britain, Russia and China. Other minority members of the commit-

tee, Arthur Vandenberg and Wallace White, Republicans, and Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Progressive, remain unconvinced that the program is workable. They declined Mr. Hull's invitation to sign a statement approving the program.

DEBATE IS FORECAST. While many leading political figures might oppose the Administration's program because they would oppose any form of collaboration, it is nevertheless true that a debate is developing among sincere friends of international action concerning the nature and purpose of collaboration. The principal issue at stake is whether the international organization which the nations intend to set up will have a broad or narrow purpose.

Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, indicated on June 5 that the Administration thinks the proposed world organization should have narrow objectives. In a speech at Mt. Vernon, Iowa, he said that the organization should be "simple and directed solely toward" preventing international war. He added that it should not be burdened with the extra tasks assigned to the League of Nations, which tried "to accomplish too many things in an approach to the millenium." Leahy's views run counter to those of Sumner Welles, former Undersecretary of State, who in an address in New York City on May 18 deplored the failure of the United States, Britain and Russia to formulate a political agency representative of all the United Nations.

The Republican Convention undoubtedly will throw some light on the political effect of the current debate and perhaps influence the administration in the international conversations. Senator Vandenberg expressed the view on April 28 that the Republicans would stand on the Mackinac Resolution of last September, which stated the need for collaboration so long as it does not impair this country's sovereignty. Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, leading candidate for the Republican nomination, spoke on April 28 in favor of international collaboration on a basis of equality among all the nations, while Lt. Comdr. Harold E. Stassen has advocated a broad international agency to accomplish a variety of objectives beyond the limited task of keeping the peace by force. The public statements of another candidate for the Republican nomination, Governor John Bricker, indicate that he favors the use of sovereign armies of the major states to enforce peace but opposes an international police force.

BLAIR BOLLES

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